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Abstract 
Characteristically, distributions of exchange-rate returns are fat-tailed. We use a nonparametnc tail-index 
estimator  based  on extreme  value  theory  for seven  EMS  currencies between  April  1979 and  October 
1991. We find that the behavior of  the Belgian franc, the Danish Krone, the French franc, and the Italian 
lira has become significantly less fat-tailed over time. We attribute this to the decline in the exchange-rate 
variance  as observed  in  the  EMS, which according  to  the  target-zone  literature should lead to a con- 
vergence of  fixed exchange-rate behavior to that of  floating rates. A comparison of  tail estimates for the 
Deutsche mark and dollar exchange rates supports this notion. 
1.  Introduction 
A well-established stylized fact in the empirical research on exchange-rate changes is 
the fat-tailedness of  the statistical distribution. The consequences of this finding for 
the choice of  distribution  and for  testing  stability  over time  are less  clear.  Both 
Student-t and stable distributions have  been  suggested  as candidates  for modeling 
exchange-rate  return distributions. ' These two distributions are not  nested  in  the 
parameter space, however, and hence, results appear to depend on the maintained 
distributional hypothesis. 
In this paper we apply extremal value  analysis using the econometric techniques 
introduced by  Koedijk, Schafgans, and de Vries  (1990). Extremal analysis investi- 
gates the distribution of  the maximum (minimum) in large samples, thereby deter- 
mining the shape of  the tails of a distribution. In fact, the limit law for the maximum 
is  characterized by  the so-called tail  index,  a, which  happens to be equal .to the 
number of  moments that exist. Thus a is a gocd indicator for the thickness of  the 
tails.  Both the stable and the Student-t distribution are nested within the limit law 
for extremes.  Using  direct estimates of  this tail index, we  test for possible  regime 
switches affecting the type of  distribution. The gain of  this procedure is that one can 
nest and test for different tail sizes. The loss consists of  information about the center 
characteristics of the distribution. Given the predominance of  outliers in  exchange- 
rate return series, however, one may benefit  from this trade-off.  In this paper, we 
apply extremal value analysis to the case of  the European Monetary System (EMS). 
One of  the unresolved issues with respect to the EMS is whether and to what extent 
its functioning has changed over time. We contribute to the issue by empirically in- 
vestigating the tail characteristics of the distributions of  seven currencies participating 
in the EMS between March 1979 and October 1991. 
Using the empirical  estimates of  the  tail index, a, first we formally test  for the 
existence of  finite second moments in EMS exchange-rate returns (Ho:  a < 2 and 
HI:  a  2  2), on which, for example, the applicability of  the Central Limit Theorem 
depends. Second, we  test for the stability of  the tail  index across subperiods. We 
find  substantial  instability  in  the  EMS  distributions  over  time.  Three  possible 
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explanations of the observed instability are evaluated: the decline in frequency and 
magnitude of realignments over time, the change in intervention behavior of  EMS 
monetary authorities over time, and the change in target-zone behavior implied by 
the decline in the variance of  exchange-rate returns. This last factor appears to be 
the most important. 
2.  Extreme Value Theory and the Tail-Index Estimator 
Consider  &, . . . ,  (Pn to be a stationary sequence of  independently and identically 
distributed (iid) exchange-rate returns with distribution function F( -).  Define M,,  as 
the maximum of this sequence of  returns: 
Mn: = ma(4l,h,.  *  *  3  4n).  (1) 
It may  then  be  shown  that  the  distribution  function  P(x)  of  M,,  for  large n 
converges towards the same limiting distribution  G(x),  independent of  whether the 
exchange-rate returns were generated  by a Student-t or sum-stable distribution. As 
the  competing  distributions are  thus  nested  within  the  same limit  law  G(x), no 
maintained hypothesis about the correct F(x) is required. The limiting distribution 
C(x)  is of the following form,  with y > 0 and the tail index a equal to lly: 
G(x) = 0,  x < 0, 
= exp(-x)-"Y  = exp(-x)-",  x 2  0.  (2) 
Relevant references on this result are Mood, Graybill and Boes (1974, p. 261) and 
Leadbetter, Lindgren,  and  Rootzen  (1983, ch.  1). The latter group have  shown 
(1983, ch. 3) that the theory also holds in case the assumption of  independence for 
the  exchange-rate  returns  is  inappropriate,  provided  the  dependency  is  not  too 
strong.' 
For  the family of  symmetric stable Paretian distributions the tail index a in  (2) 
may be interpreted as the characteristic exponent of  the stable distribution, which 
ranges between 0 and 2. For the class of  Student-t distributions the tail index a in (2) 
equals the number of  degrees of  freedom of  the distribution, ranging from zero to 
infinity. Roughly speaking, the lower the value of  a,  the thicker are the tails of  the 
distribution, all other things being equal. 
Recently, the following simple and efficient estimator of  the tail index has been 
proposed: 
Here, n represents the total number of  return observations and m  the number of 
tail observations  used  to  estimate  a. The  statistic  7  first  appears  in  Hill  (1975). 
Mason  (1982)  proves  that  under  some regularity  conditions  P is  a  consistent es- 
timator  for  y.  Goldie  and  Smith  (1987)  show  that  (it - y)mlR is  asymptotically 
normal  with  mean  zero  and variance 9.  Consequently, d  is  also  asymptotically 
normal with mean a and variance a2/m,  and asymptotic confidence intervals may be 
constructed  to test specific hypotheses. An empirical application of  this estimator 
may be found in Koedijk, Schafgans and De Vries (1990). 
As  is clear from  (3), the  above estimator only uses the positive  (right) tail of 
exchange-rate returns to estimate a and neglects the information content of the large 
negative observations in the other tail. Conditional on the right and left tails having 
the same tail index, for which we  test explicitly, we combine the information in the 
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right  and left tails  by  taking absolute  values of  the exchange-rate returns before 
ordering them and applying (3). This way, the precision of  our tail index estimates 
may  be  significantly improved.  The  number of  tail  observations m  to be  used  is 
determined through Monte Carlo sir nu la ti on^.^ 
3.  Data Description 
Our data consist of  weekly Wednesday quotations of  the  Dutch guilder,  Belgian 
franc,4 Italian  lira,  Irish  punt,  Danish  krone,  British  pound,  and  French  franc 
quoted against the German mark. The full sample covers the period starting 4 April 
1979 and ending 31 October 1991. 
In many studies of  the EMS at least two subperiods are distinguished. The first 
subperiod is usually taken to start with the founding of  the EMS in March 1979 and 
to end in March 1983. This period is characterized by strong deflationary policies in 
all  EMS countries,  though with  different  timing and  at  different  speeds, and  by 
frequent realignments of  the central EMS exchange rates. The second subperiod is 
often  taken from March 1983 to the present.  Since March 1983 realignments have 
become less frequent and smaller in magnitude.  Only five realignments have taken 
place between  1983 and October 1991, four of  which occurred between  1983 and 
1987. 
Here, we  use  September 1987 as a  second  watershed, following, for example, 
Dominguez and Kenen (1992). At that time, the countries participating in the EMS 
reached  the  so-called Basle-Nyborg Agreement,  to  deter  speculation  and  avoid 
intramarginal intervention. 
As a consequence, we divided the full sample into three subperiods of  approxi- 
mately equal length. Our first subperiod covers 4 April 1979 to 22 June 1983 (220 
observations); our second subperiod covers 29 June 1983 to 9 September 1987 (220 
observations),  and  our  third  subperiod  covers  16 September  1987 to 31  October 
1991 (216 observations). The periods encompass seven, four, and one realignment 
respectively. 
In  applied  work  with exchange rates,  returns generally are preferred to  levels. 
Where the logarithm of  the spot rate is nonstationary  and often strongly skewed, 
returns are stationary and exhibit little or no serial correlation. In general, sample 
moments of the empirical return distributions indicate absence of skewness for freely 
floating currencies, but may be skewed for other exchange-rate regimes. The kurtosis 
usually points to fatness in the tails. The EMS data reported in  Tables 1A to lC, 
when scrutinized by the usual tests, accord well with these stylized facts. The weaker 
currencies such as the Italian lira, Irish punt, and French franc tend to be skewed, as 
can be seen in Tables 1A and IB. This is probably due to recurrent devaluations. 
Note  that  skewness has disappeared, except  for the  Italian  lira, in the third sub- 
period.  All rates are significantly leptokurtic  as reported  by  the J test  on overall 
normality.'  All calculated J values considerably exceed the critical value of  the J(2) 
statistic at the 1% significance level of  9.21. 
4.  Empirical Results 
Tail Estimates 
In Table 2 we summarize the results with respect to the tail-index estimates for the 
seven EMS currencies for the three subperiods. For each period, the first column 
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Table IA. Empirical Distribution Characteristics of EMS  Currencies, April 1979 to June  1983 
(N = 220) 
Currency  Mean  Variance  Skewness  Kurtosis  S  TesP  J  Testb 
Dutch guilder  0.017  0.11  0.21  5.48  0.13  58.17 
Italian lira  0.128  0.59  1.80  15.02  2.16  1443.07 
Irish punt  0.090  0.28  1.99  14.52  2.29  1361.75 
Danish krone  0.120  0.49  1.05  17.30  2.70  1915.75 
British pound  0.004  1.63  0.52  5.14  1.62  52.15 
5.14  41.10  3.91  14274.41  French franc  0.122  0.46 
'S  Test: 2 (# obs. below mean -  ni2) fi  -  N(0, 1) for  n 4  OD. 
h/ Test n[Skewness2/6 + (k~rtosis-3)~/24]  -  ~(2). 
Belgian franc  0.100  1.45  0.05  5.21  1.08  45.02 
Table 1  B. Empirical Distribution Characteristics of  EMS  Currencies, June 1983 to September 
I987 (N = 220) 
Currency  Mean  Variance  Skewness  Kurtosis  S  Test"  J  Testb 
Dutch guilder  0.003  0.05  0.05  7.87  0.27  215.48 
Belgian franc  0.015  0.34  0.17  5.77  0.13  71.20 
Italian lira  0.092  0.25  1.58  11.40  2.02  738.717 
Irish punt  0.078  0.35  5.34  58.00  2.15  28784.38 
Danish krone  0.035  0.10  0.47  4.90  0.81  40.92 
British pound  0.120  1.36  0.28  4.31  1.35  18.52 
0.050  0.13  4.17  44.59  2.16  16492.19  French franc 
'S  Test: 2 (# obs. below mean -  nl2) fi  -  N(0, 1) for  n +  00. 
hJ  Test n[Skewness2/6 + (k~rtosis-3)~/24]  -  ~(2). 
Table  I C. Empirical  Distribution  Characteristics  of  EMS  Currencies,  September  1987  to 
October 1991 (N = 216) 
Currency  Mean  Variance  Skewness  Kurtosis  S  TesP  J  Testb 
~  ~  ~~ 
Dutch guilder  0.001  0.009  0.04  4.99  0.27  35.52 
Belgian franc  -0.003  0.110  0.50  4.81  0.14  38.55 
Italian lira  0.015  0.110  1.51  8.77  2.18  381.64 
Irish punt  0.0003  0.055  -0.41  5.26  0.13  52.07 
Danish krone  0.002  0.087  0.14  3.75  0.14  5.76 
British pound  0.009  0.712  4.53  4.30  1.22  15.24 
French franc  0.010  0.050  1.20  10.22  0.27  521.15 
"S  Test: 2 (X obs. below mean -  ni2) fi  -  N(0. 1) for  n -. m. 
h/  Test n[Skewncss2/6 + (kurtosi~-3)~i24]  -  ~(2). 
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Tuble 2. Tail Index Estimates 
1979-83  1983-87  1987- 91 
&  &+=&-  &=2  &  &+=&-  &=2  &  &+=&-  6=2  Currency 
Dutch guilder  2.55 
Belgian franc  2.13 
Italian lira  1.47 
Irish punt  2.46 
Danish krone  1.51 
(0.27) 
British pound  2.52 
(0.45) 






0.29  1.20  2.08 
(0.37) 
1.54  0.27  2.50 
(0.45) 
0.69  -2.04  2.52 
(0.45) 
0.11  1.05  1.94 
(0.35) 
0.35  -1.81  3.66 




1.93  -1.53  2.10 
0.28  0.22  3.01  0.88  1.87 
(0.54) 
1.67  0.75  3.17  0.00  2.05 
(0.57) 
1.76  1.16  2.69  1.04  1.44 
(0.4) 
0.43  -0.17  2.49  1.20  0.74 
(0.45) 
1.03  2.52  3.67  0.03  2.53 
1.12  1.54  2.73  1.25  1.49 
(0.49) 
0.31  0.26  3.42  0.45  2.33 
(0.61) 
(0.66) 
Notes: Asymptotic standard errors are below the tail-index estimates in  parentheses; a+ and a- are the 
right and left tail-index estimates respectively. 
contains the tail-index estimate using both tails (ci),  with asymptotic standard errors 
given in parentheses below the estimates. In the next column we  test for equality of 
the  tail  indices  of  the  right  and  left  tails  of  the  return  distributions,  using  the 
asymptotic normality of  the tail-index estimates. In the third column we  test for ci 
smaller or larger than 2. 
From Table 2 it appears that all point estimates of  a hover around 2. Equality of 
the left and right tail indices is never rejected, although the French franc in the first 
period  and the Italian lira in  the second period are quite close to rejection.  In all 
cases, the test statistic is below the  5%  critical value of  1.96. This warrants simul- 
taneous  use  of  both  tails  in  the  further  analysis.  From  now  on, we  will  focus, 
therefore, on 8. 
The null hypothesis of H,:  a < 2 against the alternative HI:  a 3 2, is  rejected at 
the 5% level if the test statistic exceeds 1.64. For the alternative test of  H,:  a 3 2 
versus H,:  a < 2,  is rejected at the 5%  level if the test statistic is below -1.64. 
Summarizing the results in the last column of  Table 2, we conclude that Ho:  a 3 2 is 
rejected  for  the  Italian  lira  and  Danish  krone  before  1983, while  H,:  a < 2  is 
rejected for the Danish krone after 1983 and for the Belgian franc, the French franc, 
and  the  Dutch  guilder  after  1987. This  suggests the  existence  of  finite  second 
moments for at least four of  the seven EMS  currencies. 
Note that for those currencies where the null hypothesis of a < 2 is rejected, the 
sum-stable distribution is rejected as a potential generating distribution of  exchange- 
rate returns. Similarly, Student-r distributions with less than two degrees of  freedom 
are rejected for these currencies. 
Comparing the distributional properties of exchange-rate returns is hazardous, as 
results have generally been obtained through the use  of  methods requiring a main- 
tained  hypothesis  about  the  underlying  distribution.  Nevertheless,  our  tail-index 
estimates for the first period of  the EMS are close to the level reported by  Wester- 
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field (1977) for the Bretton Woods era. More recent exchange-rate behavior in  the 
EMS yields tail estimates closer to those reported by  Boothe and Glassman (1987) 
for floating rates. An intriguing aspect from Table 2 is the apparent rise in the tail 
index estimates over time: the average tail index is 2.03 for the period April 1979 to 
April  1983 and  3.03  for  the  period  September  1987 to October  1991. For some 
countries, the evidence even tentatively suggests that the EMS exchange-rate distri- 
butions have experienced a regime switch from sum-stable to Student-1. We there- 
fore turn  to the issue of regime changes and their  effect on  EMS exchange-rate 
distributions. 
Regime Changes 
Next, we  test whether the exchange-rate behavior of  a specific country has signifi- 
cantly  changed  over  time.  To do so  we  formally  test  for  the  equality  of  the  a 
estimates from Table 2 over time. We use the asymptotic normality of  the tail-index 
estimates and, thus, of the difference between them. The results are shown in Table 3. 
Table  3 shows a  tendency  for  the  tail-index  estimates to  rise  over  time.  The 
economic  interpretation  of  this  rise  in  tail  estimates  over  time  is  that  extreme 
exchange-rate changes in  the EMS have become less frequent over time.  For the 
traditionally weak currencies, in particular, we find significant increases in the tail 
index. For the Italian lira and the Danish krone the tail index is significantly higher 
after 1983, while the tail-index estimate for the French franc is significantly higher 
after 1987 at the 10% level. The results for the French franc corroborate the results 
in Dominguez and Kenen (1992) that the French franc experienced a regime change 
in 1987. They attribute this result to the fact that the French franc made fuller use of 
the band width after September 1981. For Belgium, a gradual rise in the tail index is 
observed. The hypothesis that  the  Belgian franc tail  index is higher  in  the third 
period than in the first cannot be rejected at the 10% level. 
We now turn to possible explanations of  the observed phenomenon of  systema- 
tically rising tail-index estimates over the lifetime of  the EMS. First, we investigate 
to what extent our results are influenced by  the realignments in the EMS.  To this 
end, we estimate tail indices over subperiods for each country with the realignment 
Table 3. Stability of  Tail Indices Across Subperiods 
~  ~- 
Test Statistics 
Currency  61 = 62  62 = 63  61 = 63 
~~ 
Dutch gudder  0.80  1.42  0.65 
Italian lira  2.00  0.25  2.27 
Danish krone  3.03  0.01  3.03 
British pound  0.37  0.06  0.31 
French franc  1.13  1.83  2.74 
Notes: Test  statistics have  an  asymptotic N(0,  1)  distribution. Sub- 
scripts of  d  refer to  the different subperiods  1. 2. and 3. 
Belgian franc  0.63  0.92  1.52 
Irish punt  0.92  0.97  0.05 
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weeks excluded. Second, we investigate to what extent different intervention policies 
over time by the EMS countries can explain the observed rise in tail-index estimates. 
Since actual intervention data are kept secret and are not published, we perform a 
Monte Carlo experiment  to simulate the effect of  interventions on EMS tail esti- 
mates. Third, we analyze the consequences of  the observed decline in the variance 
of EMS exchange-rate returns for the tail-index estimates in a target-zone  frame- 
work. For this purpose, we compare the tail estimates for the EMS exchange rates 
relative  to  the  deutsche  mark  to  tail  estimates  for  the  corresponding  US  dollar 
exchange rates. 
Tail Estimates Adjusted for Realignments 
To investigate whether  our results are sensitive to the  nonuniform  occurrence of 
realignments  over  the  full  sample period,  we  estimate  the  tail  indices with  the 
realignment weeks excluded from the sample. The results are shown in Table 4. 
Exclusion of  the 7 realignments between  1979 and  1983 increases the tail-index 
estimates  for  all  countries  participating  in  the  exchange-rate  mechanism (ERM) 
except for the Netherlands.  Exclusion  of the  4  realignment  weeks  in  the  period 
1983-87 leads to somewhat higher tail-index estimates for France, Italy, and Ireland. 
Overall, the exclusion of  realignment weeks thus yields higher tail-index estimates 
for the weak EMS currencies. That is, part of  the relatively strong fat-tailedness of 
these currencies in the first and second subperiods has been caused by  the realign- 
ments. This does not change our initial results,  however, indicating that there has 
been a general rise in tail indices over time and that for Denmark, France, and Italy 
tail-index estimates have risen significantly. As can be inferred from Table 4, the 
average a increases over time, from 2.24  during 1979-83  to 3.03 during 1987-91. 
The fourth column of  Table 4 tests the equality of  tail indices in subperiods 1 and 3 
and shows that the rises in the tail indices for France and Denmark remain significant 
at the 5%  level, while the result for Italy is still significant at the 10% level. Only for 
Belgium is the rise in the tail index insignificant now. Hence, our conclusion that the 
EMS experienced  a significant change in behavior still stands, even when  realign- 
ments are taken into consideration. We now turn to the effect of different interven- 
tion policies on the tail estimates. 
Table 4.  Tail Indices with Realignments  Excluded 
Test Stabtics 
Currency  61  82  83  8, = 83 
Dutch guilder  2.48  2.08  3.01  0.76 
Italian lira  1.68  2.93  2.69  1.78 
Irish punt  2.79  2.45  2.49  0.45 
Danish krone  1.72  3.68  3.67  2.68 
British pound  2.52  2.77  2.73  0.31 
French franc  2.01  2.45  3.42  1.99 
Belgian franc  2.51  2.50  3.17  0.91 
Notes: Test  statistics have  an  asymptotic  N(0,  1)  distribution.  Sub- 
scripts refer to the different subperiods 1, 2, and 3. 
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The Effect of  Intervention on Tail Estimates: A Simulation Study 
At the start of  the EMS a clear distinction was made between marginal and intra- 
marginal intervention.6 While countries were obliged to support their own currency 
at the margin of the fluctuation band, intramarginal intervention was to be executed 
on a voluntary basis and, moreover, was subject to a number of  restrictions. Most 
important is the fact that the Very Short Term Financing facility provided unlimited 
means  to countries  for  marginal  interventions, whereas no financial  support  was 
given to intramarginal interventions. Nevertheless,  Ungerer et al. (1990) state that 
intramarginal intervention became the rule rather than the exception rather soon. 
For ease of  exposition, three intervention  regimes can be distinguished over the 
lifetime of  the EMS coinciding with the three subperiods used earlier. In the period 
1979-83  both  intramarginal  and  marginal  interventions  were  important.  In  the 
period  1983-87,  most  countries  undertook  to  coordinate  their  policies,  aiming 
at  convergence to the  anchor-country,  Germany.  As  a consequence, the  role  of 
marginal  interventions  significantly  decreased,  while  intramarginal  interventions 
increased. In the Basle-Nyborg Agreement in 1987, however, the decision was made 
to  make  fuller  use  of  the  fluctuation margin  and  to  use  the  interest  rate more 
frequently in supporting exchange rates, to avoid the use of  intramarginal interven- 
tion. After 1987, therefore, intramarginal intervention decreased. 
To shed some more light on the effects of  interventions on the tail behavior of 
exchange  rates,  the  following simulation experiment  was  set  up.  A  hypothetical 
exchange  rate  versus the  German  mark  is  assumed  to have  a  central  parity  of 
3.35386 (equal  to the  actual French franc parity  since 12 January  1987). Weekly 
percentage changes in  this exchange rate have a variance of  0.21903 (equal to the 
overall variance of French franc exchange-rate innovations over the period 1979-91). 
The actual exchange rate can deviate at most 2.25% from its panty at any moment. 
Intervention behavior by monetary authorities is modeled in the following way. The 
authorities may set an intervention limit at the 2.25% margin (mandatory within the 
EMS)  or lower, at 75%,  50%,  or 25%  of  the  total  margin.  This latter attitude 
reflects increasing unwillingness to have the exchange rate deviate from the central 
panty.  On the  effectiveness of  intramarginal or marginal intervention we  assume 
that as soon as the actual exchange rate crosses the intervention  limit (25%, 50%, 
75%0,  or 100% of  the overall margin), the effect of  the intervention is to drive the 
exchange rate back from the intervention limit towards the central panty. This inter- 
vention effect is simulated by  drawing from a uniform distribution.  The resulting 
exchange rate equals the intervention limit plus or minus the realization of  the draw 
from the uniform distribution. Different  assumptions are made about the charac- 
teristics of  the  uniform  distribution  to  reflect  differences in  effectiveness. For  a 
relatively ineffective intervention, a uniform distribution is specified that only allows 
an exchange-rate more towards the parity of  at most 25%  of  the difference between 
the intervention limit and the parity. For more effective interventions the effect may 
be larger (50%,  75%, or even 100%). 
For each combination of  assumed intervention effectiveness and  assumed inter- 
vention behavior of the monetary authorities (different intervention limits), a Monte 
Carlo experiment  consisting of  500 replications is executed.  In each replication, a 
series of  220 (equal to the number of  observations in our subperiods) exchange-rate 
innovations  is  randomly  drawn  from  a  Student-t  distribution  with  3  degrees  of 
freedom.  These  innovations are  added  to  the  initial  level  of  the  exchange rate 
(assumed to be the panty) and compounded with random draws from the current 
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Table 5. Tail Indices Including Simulated Interventions 
Intervention Effectiveness 
Intervention 
Limit  25%  50%  75 %  100% 
25%  4.13 
50%  3.21  4.01 
I5  Yo  3.05  3.43  3.18 
100%  2.97  3.20  3.05  2.17 
uniform distribution as soon as the intervention limit is crossed. Returns from the 
resulting  series are used  to estimate  the  series’ tail  index.  Table  5 contains  the 
average tail-index estimate across replications for each experiment. 
In Table 5 two points stand out. First and most important, an increasing interven- 
tion limit-given  the level of  intervention effectiveness-results  in lower tail-index 
estimates.  Intuitively,  this  could  have  been  expected.  For  a  given  variance  of 
exchange-rate innovations,  a wider  effective fluctuation margin  allows for  larger 
changes in exchange rates without correction through interventions. This will lead to 
fatter tails and lower tail-index estimates. Note, though, that according to this, the 
EMS  regime change in 1987, after which wider fluctuation margins were observed, is 
unable to explain the rise in tail-index estimates. 
Second, increasing intervention effectiveness, for a given intervention limit, first 
leads to higher tail-index estimates but then to lower ones. Intuitively, this finding 
may be explained by pointing to two opposite effects on the exchange rate: on the 
one hand, a relatively large shock which makes the exchange rate cross the inter- 
vention  limit is reduced in size by  the compensating intervention, leading to less 
large shocks and thinner tails; however, if the intervention becomes so effective as to 
dominate the original move in the exchange rate, tails may become fatter. This latter 
phenomenon, however, may be more of  a theoretical artifact than a real-world issue. 
Overall, our results do not suggest that changes in intervention behavior over time 
have  been  the  causal factor behind  the  general rise  in  tail-index  estimates.  We 
therefore  turn  to  a discussion of the implications of  the  decline in  exchange-rate 
variances within a target-zone framework. 
An  Explanation From the Target-Zone Approach 
During the past few years the exchange-rate behavior within a target zone has been 
formalized.’  This literature starts from  the observation  that  due to  the  forward- 
looking nature of  rational  expectations models,  the presence  of  a band exerts an 
influence on the current movements of  exchange rates. 
Although empirical evidence in favor of  the target-zone literature is  scarce, the 
analytical framework  gives  an  attractive  theoretical  explanation  for  the  kind  of 
circumstances under which the behavior of exchange rates within a band will  differ 
from the behavior of  fully floating exchange rates, and under which circumstances 
they will coincide. One of  the implications of  the target-zone literature is that for a 
given exchange-rate band, a decline in the variance of  exchange-rate returns makes 
exchange-rate behavior in the target zone converge to the free float. 
Table 1 shows that for all currencies participating in the exchange-rate mechanism 
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of  the EMS except Ireland, there has been a monotonic decline in the variance of 
exchange-rate returns  over time.  This has been  most  pronounced  for the weaker 
EMS currencies. Possible explanations for this decrease in variance are convergence 
of  fundamentals, an increase in  the credibility of  the system,  an increased  use  of 
interest-rate instruments to protect EMS parities,* or a combination of these clearly 
interdependent factors. 
The target-zone literature implies that as a consequence of  this variance reduction, 
tail-index estimates for the various EMS exchange rates against the Deutsche mark 
should converge to corresponding tail-index estimates relative to floating currencies 
like, for example, the US dollar. 
First, therefore, we estimate the tail estimates of  the EMS currencies relative to 
the US dollar.'  The results are reported in Table 6. 
A comparison of  Tables 6 and 3 shows that tail estimates relative to the US dollar 
tend to be higher'"  than those relative to the Deutsche mark, reflecting the lower 
probability mass in  the tails for floating exchange rates. Moreover, there is no evi- 
dence of  a change in behavior of  the US dollar tail estimates over time, suggesting 
that the reported change in  behavior is specific to the EMS.  To  further study the 
difference between  Deutsche  mark  rates  and dollar rates we  formally test for the 
equality of  the respective tail estimates. 
As  is apparent from Table 6, in  the early 1980s the tail estimates of  at least four 
EMS  currencies against the Deutsche mark (Belgian franc, Italian lira, Danish krone, 
and  French  franc)  are  significantly different  from  the  corresponding  dollar  tail 
estimates. After 1987 this difference disappears. Hence, our results show a conver- 
gence of tail-index estimates for fixed and floating exchange rates for EMS countries 
over time coinciding with the reduction in  exchange-rate variance within the EMS. 
This is  consistent with our null hypothesis based on the target-zone framework for 
fixed exchange rates."  It should be noted however that the recent turmoil in  EMS 
currency markets since September 1992 may  have reversed this trend. 
We conclude that the observed instability in tail-index estimates within the EMS is 
largely due to the decrease in exchange-rate  variance over time, as it renders the 
restrictions imposed by  the fluctuation bands less binding. The decline in frequency 
and magnitude of  realignments may have played an additional role in raising the tail 
estimates. 
Table 6. Tail Estimates Relative to rhe  Dollar 
Test Statistics 
Currency  67  6fi"  &,  = &y  62 = by  bJ = by 
Dutch guilder  3.21  3.62  3.76  0.90  2.05  0.87 
Belgian franc  3.99  3.48  3.72  2.29  1.27  0.63 
Italian lira  3.34  3.87  4.00  2.85  1.63  1.51 
Irish punt  3.58  3.93  3.67  1.44  2.52  1.48 
Danish krone  3.18  4.22  4.01  2.64  0.56  0.36 
British pound  3.39  2.37  3.10  1.15  0.61  0.50 
French franc  3.62  3.44  4.06  2.89  1.85  0.67 
German mark  3.62  3.83  3.64  -  -  - 
Notes: Test  statistics have  an  asymptotic  N(0. 1) distribution.  Subscripts of  d  refer to  the  different 
subperiods 1. 2. and 3. 
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Our tail-index  analysis also sheds some light on the controversy in the literature 
about the relative “riskiness”  of  fixed versus floating exchange-rate  regimes.”  It is 
often  argued that  floating exchange-rate  regimes  tend  to smooth movements  on 
foreign-exchange markets compared with fixed exchange-rate regimes and that fixed 
exchange-rate regimes tend  to be characterized by  larger probabilities of  extreme 
changes.I3  Under the  assumption  that  movements in  exchange  rates  are predo- 
minantly  caused by  divergences in  the underlying fundamentals  across countries,“ 
this  generally  results  in  both  a  higher  variance  and  fatter tails  of  exchange-rate 
returns in a fixed regime. 
In practice, however, it has often been observed that the variance of  both nominal 
and  real exchange-rate  returns  in  a  floating-rate  regime  significantly  exceeds  the 
variance  in  a  fixed-rate  regime  (see, for example, Mussa  [1986]),  maybe  due to 
erratic and uncoordinated  exchange-rate  policies,  speculation  unrelated  to  funda- 
mentals, or both.  At the same time, the literature suggests fatter tails under fixed 
than under floating rates.  Judged  by  the variance  level  of  exchange-rate  returns, 
floating may result  in  more riskiness.  Judged by the fat-tailedness, however,  fixed 
rates  are  more  risky.  This  appears  to present  a  trade-off:  how  much  average 
exchange-rate variability in  a floating exchange-rate  regime is to be preferred to a 
particular  degree of  fat-tailedness  (representing discrete  and  unpredictable  large 
exchange-rate changes) in a fixed exchange-rate regime. 
Our results suggest that  it may be possible to have a fixed exchange-rate regime 
with  absolute lower  variance  of  exchange-rate  returns  than  under  a  floating-rate 
regime, while enjoying comparable fat-tailedness.  In general, the difference in fat- 
tailedness,  as measured by  the tail-index  estimates, is suggested  to depend on the 
degree to which  the  fixed  exchange-rate  regime  imposes  binding  restrictions  on 
exchange-rate behavior.  This, in turn, depends on the width of  the allowed fluctua- 
tion margin compared to the degree  of  convergence and credibility of  the system. 
More precisely,  the  adherence  to  a  fixed  exchange-rate  regime  may  reduce  the 
overall variance of  exchange-rate returns by reducing the variance of the underlying 
fundamentals through coordinated policies. As long as the regime is credible, it may, 
moreover, reduce exchange-rate variance due to speculation. When, in addition, the 
fluctuation margins are chosen sufficiently wide for the currently obtained degree of 
convergence,  the  need  for large realignments  will  be small, and the fat-tailedness 
may approach that of  a floating exchange-rate regime with a comparable degree of 
coordination and in  the absence of speculation unrelated to fundamentals. 
6.  Conclusions 
In  this paper we provide  new  insights in  the empirical distribution of  seven EMS 
exchange-rate returns between April 1979 and October 1991 by focusing on the in- 
formation in the tails of the distribution. We investigate the amount of  fat-tailedness 
and  the  stability  of  the  distribution’s  tail  behavior  over time  using  a  tail-index 
estimator, a, that is based on extreme value theory. 
We find  considerable kurtosis  of  exchange-rate returns for  all periods  and cur- 
rencies. Point estimates of the tail index a are mostly above 2. The tail estimates of 
especially the weak EMS currencies increase substantially over time. Stability tests 
show that the behavior of  the Italian lira and the Danish krone changed significantly 
over time after 1983, while the behavior of the French franc changed after 1987. This 
latter  result  corroborates  the  work  by  Dominguez  and  Kenen  (1992).  For  the 
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Belgian franc a significant difference between tail estimates for the first and the third 
subperiod is found. 
We  investigate  three  possible  explanations of  this  phenomenon:  the  effect  of 
realignments, the effect of  a change in intervention policies over time, and the effect 
of  a decline in variance, as implied by the target-zone literature. While the decrease 
in  frequency  and  magnitude  of  realignments  over  time  has  indeed  contributed 
somewhat to the observed rise in  tail estimates, it cannot be the complete story. A 
sirnulation experiment on different types of intervention policy provides no clear-cut 
evidence supportive of  a rise in EMS  tail estimates. 
Finally, the target-zone literature suggests that exchange-rate behavior in a fixed 
exchange-rate regime should converge to exchange-rate behavior in a free float when 
a  decline  in  variance  occurs.  Comparison  of  the  EMS fixed  exchange-rate  tail 
estimates with tail estimates for the same currencies relative to the US dollar indeed 
reveals a convergence of  fixed and floating tail estimates over time. While the US 
dollar tail estimates remain stable in the range 3-4  across subperiods, the fixed-rate 
tail estimates  gradually rise  towards this level over the lifetime of  the EMS.  This 
presents strong support for the impact of  the decline in  variance on our tail esti- 
mates, in line with the target-zone framework for fixed exchange rates. 
Our results also shed some light on the discussion about the relative “riskiness” of 
fixed versus flexible exchange-rate regimes. The evidence here suggests that fixed 
or semi-fixed exchange-rate regimes  are not  necessarily more  risky  than  floating 
exchange-rate  regimes. According to our results, the difference in tail-index esti- 
mates of fixed and floating exchange rates appears to depend on the degree to which 
the fixed  exchange-rate regime imposes binding restrictions on exchange-rate  be- 
havior.  This,  in  turn,  depends  on  the  width  of  the  allowed  fluctuation  margin 
compared to the degree of  obtained convergence and credibility of  the system. 
Notes 
1.  An  excellent review of  the literature on exchange-rate distributions is contained in Boothe 
and Glassman (1987). 
2.  For some EMS returns there is weak serial correlation. Full estimation results are available 
from the authors upon request. 
3.  Each  Monte Carlo experiment consisted  of  500  replications of  n  draws from  different 
Student-t distributions with degrees of freedom (= a)  equal to 1,2,3  and 4. Optimal m-levels 
are selected by minimizing the mean squared error across replications. Full simulation results 
are available upon request from the authors. For one-sided tail indices the optimal m = 20, 
while for two-sided tail indices the optimal m = 31. 
4.  Over the major part of  the period, a dual exchange-rate system was in use in Belgium. The 
official Belgian franc exchange rate is used here as it is the one the Belgian authorities have to 
support in the exchange-rate mechanism (EM)  of the EMS. 
5. If  the third and fourth moments of  the underlying distributions are infinite, as suggested by 
estimates of  a presented later on, one  may  question the  usefulness of  the  skewness and 
kurtosis statistics presented  here. We  nevertheless provide their values  as preliminary evi- 
dence of  non-normality of  exchange-rate returns. 
6.  For detailed information on the functioning of  intervention within the EMS and its changes 
over time, we refer to Mastropasqua, Micossi, and Rinaldi (1988) and Ungerer et al. (1990). 
7. For an overview of  this literature, see Krugman (1991) and Krugman and Miller (1992). 
8.  Recent work by Gros (1992) suggests that this is the case for the post-1987 period. 
9.  Unpublished results for the  EMS  exchange rates  against the Japanese  yen  were  quite 
similar to those for the US dollar and are available from the authors on request. 
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10. Table 6 shows that our estimates  for the dollar  exchange  rates are quite  close to the 
results reported in Boothe and Glassman (1987) using a different methodology. The estimates 
reported  in  Table 6 suggest  that  a  Student-t  distribution  with  3 or 4  degrees  of  freedom 
provides an accurate description of  dollar exchange-rate behavior. 
11. For  the  UK.  no  systematic  rise  in  tail  estimates  for  its exchange  rate  relative  to  the 
Deutsche mark is found, nor can equality between dollar and Deutsche mark tail estimates be 
rejected. This is consistent  with the floating exchange  rate of  the pound  against both  dollar 
and Deutsche mark over most of  the period. 
12. See for instance Friedman  (1953) and Westerfield (1977). 
13. See Westerfield  (1977) for  evidence  on  the  fixed  Bretton  Woods era and  Boothe  and 
Glassman (1987) for evidence on floating exchange rates between  1973 and  1986. 
14. An additional assumption is the long-run constancy of  the real exchange rate. 
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